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Abstract
Background: This essay provides an ethical and conceptual argument for the use of informed consent prior to
the diagnosis of brain death. It is meant to enable the family to make critical end-of-life decisions, particularly
withdrawal of life support system and organ donation, before brain death is diagnosed, as opposed to the
current practice of making such decisions after the diagnosis of death. The recent tragic case of a 13-year-old
brain-dead patient in California who was maintained on a ventilator for over 2 years illustrates how such a
consent would have made a crucial difference.
Methods: Conceptual, philosophical, and ethical analysis.
Results: I first consider a conceptual justification for the use of consent for certain non-beneficial and
unwanted medical diagnoses. I suggest that the diagnosis of brain death falls into this category for
some patients. Because the diagnostic process of brain death lacks the transparency of traditional death
determination, has a unique epistemic structure and a complex risk-benefit profile which differs markedly
from case to case, and presents conflicts of interest for physicians and society, I argue that pre-diagnostic
counseling and informed consent should be part of the diagnostic process. This approach can be termed
as “allow cardiac death”, whose parallel logic with “allow natural death” is discussed. I also discuss potential
negative impacts on organ donation and health care cost from this proposal and offer possible mitigation.
I show that the pre-diagnostic counseling can improve the possibility for well-thought-out decisions regarding
organ donation and terminating life-support system in cases of hopeless prognosis. This approach differs
conceptually from the pluralism of the definition of death, such as those in New Jersey and Japan, and it
upholds the Uniform Determination of Death Act.
Conclusions: My intention is not to provide an instant panacea for the ongoing impasse of the brain
death debate, but to point to a novel conceptual ground for a more pragmatic, and more patient-
and family-centered approach. By enabling the family to consent to or decline the diagnostic process of
brain death, but not to choose the definition of death, it upholds the current legal definition of death.
Keywords: Informed consent, Brain death, Death determination, Jahi McMath, End-of-life decisions, Organ
donation
Introduction
Determination of death by neurologic criteria or brain
death determination (BDD) has become an integral first
step toward harvesting vital organs for transplantation
from severely brain-damaged donors. Medical, legal, and
bioethical communities worldwide, even in countries
such as Israel and Japan where it has traditionally been a
cultural taboo, currently accept the use of BDD. Never-
theless, skepticism and confusion about the theory and
practice of brain death (BD) have not abated among the
general public and even among healthcare professionals
[1–4]. A recent high-profile case in California highlighted
this confusion about BD and rekindled the debate. Jahi
McMath, a then 13-year-old girl, was pronounced brain
dead in December 2013 at the Children’s Hospital
Oakland following a complication of the surgical treat-
ment of her sleep apnea. Because of the persistent refusal
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of her family to accept this diagnosis, she has been main-
tained on “life support”—for more than 2 years as of this
writing—in an apartment in New Jersey.
Many comments, criticisms, and words of support
about this case have already been published (readers can
refer to the case details in [5, 6]). In this essay, I focus
on only one question that came up in ethical analysis:
What would have happened if the family had been in-
volved and fully informed of the implication of BDD and
given a chance to consent before proceeding to the diag-
nostic process? It is unclear from reading various reports
whether the family refused the diagnostic process of BDD
from the outset, or accepted the diagnostic process, but
later rejected the result. Regardless of the scenario, it is
almost certain that the family would wish that the patient
had never undergone this whole process.
The recent debate on BD in scholarly literature focuses
on the issues related to organ donation and the dead
donor rule, while BD-related ethical issues outside the
organ-donation context are less controversial. BDD is rou-
tinely made in intensive care units (ICU) and emergency
departments in the process of terminating the life support
of hopelessly brain-damaged patients with very little or no
approval from the family or surrogate, as seen in the
McMath case (hereafter, I will use the term “family” to
include other appropriate surrogate decision makers when
family members are unavailable). Of course, once BDD is
positive, it is a legal death and, technically speaking, the
patient (now a corpse) will be quickly placed outside the
boundary of health care. While BDD in the context of
organ donation is the crucial first step to save other lives,
and post-BDD care or “bodily support on a corpse”, is
meticulously performed to ensure the freshness of the
organs, BDD outside the context of organ donation and
rare cases of brain-dead pregnant women is considered
just a cut-and-dried legal step to terminate medical care.
That is why the McMath case is so unusual in view of this
customary practice. While most hospitals have a protocol
for removing life support promptly following positive
BDD, it is often extremely difficult when the family does
not accept such a diagnosis. Some commentators on the
McMath case criticized the hospital for its delay in remo-
ving life support. For example, one commentator wrote,
“… not only is there no need to ask the family’s permission
to remove a respirator, but to do so is highly inappro-
priate” ([5], 380). It was argued that the involvement of
the McMath family in Jahi’s case simply served to confuse
them further about the status of their child, which, in turn,
led to the ensuing dispute. The best course of action,
according to this line of thought, is to diagnose BD and
discontinue life support unilaterally, regardless of the
family’s objections.
While I acknowledge that this is a common practice in
many US institutions in recent years, it raises several
questions. Even if a grieving period of a few hours is
allowed before termination, it precludes any family par-
ticipation in important end-of-life decisions. Prior to
BDD, the medical team engages in patient- and family-
centered medical care, and the family’s values and wishes
are usually respected, but once BDD is positive, there is
no scope for “patient”-centered care because the patient
is deceased. While death might be considered as a
biological “event,” as seen in the theoretical foundation
of BD ([7], 389), death is certainly a long process for
many families. They need adequate preparation, and
slow and gradual processing after death determination.
In a sense, this may be the time when the family wishes
to make decisions consistent with their moral and
cultural values, more so than when the patient was still
alive. Such wishes might include a choice for death by
the traditional criteria instead of BD, particularly when
the family has not been fully informed of the implications
of the BDD and not yet prepared to receive such a diag-
nosis. However, once BDD has been made it is too late to
express any preferences because it is an incontestable
medicolegal determination in most jurisdictions, as seen
in the McMath case. Therefore, one might ask whether
there is any room for including the family in decision
making prior to BDD. In this essay, I submit an argument
that a formal dialogue on crucial end-of-life decisions
should take place prior to BDD in the form of a family
conference and informed consent.
From the outset, however, I wish to emphasize that
this essay proposes consent to the diagnostic process of
BDD, not to the definition of death. In general it may
seem odd to consent to a diagnostic process itself. This
is because a medical diagnosis is an essential component
of patient care and almost always considered beneficial
to the patient as long as the diagnosis is used for bene-
ficial care. However, in some special cases, such a diag-
nosis may not be beneficial or can be harmful to the
patient. In such cases, the wishes of the patient and
family should be respected before proceeding to a diag-
nostic process. As discussed shortly, there are already
several instances in which potentially harmful diagnoses
require informed consent. Is BDD such a case? Another
important caveat to be clarified at the outset is that the
consent to the criteria of brain death is conceptually and
practically different from the consent to the diagnostic
process to fulfill the criteria. Obviously, one could accept
the criteria, but could still refuse the diagnostic process
if there are issues in the process, such as risks and accu-
racy, that are problematic for the patient and family. This
essay addresses the process, not the criteria.
In what follows, I will not plunge into the ongoing
fierce debate whether BD is truly human death, but con-
centrate on ethical dilemmas that necessitate consent
prior to the diagnostic process. (For the sake of fairness,
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I will briefly summarize my position on this debate in
the last endnote.) First, I will clarify conceptual issues
involved in consenting to medical diagnosis in general,
and brain death in particular. Next, I will examine
whether consent prior to BDD is feasible, and does not
violate the law currently in place, at least in the US. In
the following two sections I will address the question of
what ethical dilemmas exist that necessitate consent. I
demonstrate that the risk-benefit profile of BDD is vastly
different from patient to patient, particularly between
organ donors and non-organ donors, which requires
individualized patient-centered decisions. Other impor-
tant reasons for honest disclosure and clarification in-
clude conflicts of interest, a complex epistemic structure
behind the purported perfect accuracy of the diagnosis
of BD, and a lack of transparency and perceived diagnos-
tic discrepancy with the reality of the patient’s condition.
After the practice of informed consent for BDD is de-
scribed, two major objections and challenges will be con-
sidered next: distributive justice of healthcare resources
and potential negative impacts on organ donation. In the
final section, I compare this proposal with other pluralistic
approaches to legal death, such as those of New Jersey,
New York, and Japan. I stress the point that this proposal
is not to introduce the pluralism of the definition of death,
but to present a simple device for consenting to or declin-
ing a diagnostic process while upholding the current legal
definition of death. As will be mentioned in the end of this
article, the author’s intention is not to provide an instant
panacea for extremely difficult issues involved in cases like
Jahi McMath, but to point to a novel conception for
exploring a pragmatic approach to the intractable prob-
lems of brain death.
Conceptual justification for informed consent to medical
diagnosis
The first question that needs to be clarified is whether
the concept of consent makes any sense for the diagno-
sis of brain death, and whether it is feasible. I will first
consider consent to medical diagnosis in general.
Medical diagnosis is a complex process of cognition and
action, which consists of several integral steps. First, a
clinician has to decide to diagnose or rule out a condition.
This step seems banal, but the important point here is that
there is always an option for a clinician not to proceed to
any diagnostic process.1 Second, a clinician performs diag-
nostic evaluation, such as taking history, examining the
patient, and ordering and performing tests. Third, a
clinician should decide what diagnostic criteria or algo-
rithm to use to come up with a diagnosis based on the
second step. This is closely tied to the second step because
in order to establish a diagnosis, an evaluation has to be
done to give relevant information required by the criteria.
Finally, once a diagnosis is made, it has to be decided
whether the patient receives the diagnosis and is treated
accordingly, or it is withheld and not used or used for
other purposes. Each step is contingent upon the decision
of the clinician, which means that there is room, to some
extent, for the patient and family to express preferences.
Consent to the first step is usually implied if a patient
seeks a diagnosis from a clinician. However, if a diag-
nosed condition is devastating or fatal with little or no
possibility of cure, or if it comes with stigma and dis-
crimination, or if a false positive or negative diagnosis
leads to further harm, informed consent and pre-
diagnostic counseling are often required before initiating
the diagnostic process. Many genetic diagnoses are often
of incurable conditions, such as cancer genes and
Huntington’s disease, and informed consent is now used
routinely. HIV testing used to be in this category, but
with improved treatment and prognosis in recent years,
the requirement for consent has been gradually relaxed.
Of course, in a vast majority of common medical condi-
tions, there is a bona fide agreement that a physician
may proceed to a diagnostic process without explicit
consent, believing that the benefit from such a diagnosis
would outweigh any risks. In terms of the second step
(diagnostic evaluation), when the test is invasive and
involves risks, it is necessary to seek informed consent
except in an emergency. Even if the risk is reasonably
small, the patient may still want to decline the diagnostic
procedure, such as a colonoscopy, for reasons of pain
and discomfort, and informed consent is still indispens-
able. On the other hand, if the diagnostic evaluation
depends on a clinician’s cognitive judgment without
involving any risky test, this is usually done without con-
sent. Consent to diagnostic criteria (third step) is indeed
an unusual one, and it rarely comes up. In modern
medicine, many medical diagnoses are made according
to established diagnostic criteria, and most patients and
clinicians take it for granted, but if there are different
diagnostic criteria available and a patient can be classi-
fied differently by different criteria, it is conceivable that
the patient may want to consent to or refuse one criter-
ion over another. For example, the diagnosis of multiple
sclerosis, or autism spectrum disorder, might be different
depending on which criteria are used, particularly for
borderline cases. The final step of informing a patient of
the diagnosis and using it for other purposes may also
require the patient’s involvement. Some patients from a
non-Western cultural background request not to receive
a serious life-threatening diagnosis such as a cancer diag-
nosis, particularly when it is terminal, and we generally
honor such a request by giving the diagnosis to designated
family members. It is also possible that a diagnosis comes
up as a result of an evaluation that was done for other
purposes. A brain scan done for a research purpose might
reveal an incidental brain aneurysm. The disclosure and
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usage of such a diagnosis obviously requires the patient’s
consent.
In the following sections, I will concentrate on the first
and second steps (the decision to proceed with, and then
execute the diagnostic process) of BDD, and show that
consent is feasible and desirable. The third step of choo-
sing the diagnostic criteria of death is, in practice, not
something clinicians or families can pick and choose. It is
decided by the medical condition leading to death and by
the law, and this essay does not intend to propose a legal
amendment, as discussed in a later section. There is little
or no choice, under the current law and the practice
guidelines, for the final step of communicating the result
of BDD and applying it as the final diagnosis of death,
because positive BDD is by definition the diagnosis of BD,
which in turn is by law the determination of death. There
is no room to manipulate or withhold this fact.
Contingency of brain death and necessity of traditional
death
Critics may argue at this point that there is still some-
thing odd about consenting to death determination.
Generally speaking, with the exception of suicide, death
comes to us without our choice or control, and it is
usually too late to express any preference for how to die
using informed consent when we face imminent death.
Physicians do not obtain consent prior to a traditional
death determination with cardio-respiratory criteria. Con-
sent makes sense only when a choice for another course
of action is available, but death happens almost always
as a necessary (inevitable) event without choice, critics
might say.
While there is no space for metaphysical discussion of
the necessity and contingency of human death, suffice it
to say that folk metaphysics appears to accept the meta-
physical necessity of death, as seen in the famous adage
of “death and taxes”. If the critics can agree that death
is a necessary event for every human being (except in
religious realms), is BD also a necessary event? In fact, it is
quite the opposite. The vast majority of population does
not die of BD. BD is a highly contingent event: It is con-
tingent on sustaining severe brain damage with relatively
preserved body organs, timely administration of life sup-
port and admission to a hospital while the heart is still
functioning, a physician’s judgment that the patient likely
is brain dead, and most importantly the physician’s chosen
action to proceed to the diagnostic protocol of BDD. A
traditional death by cardio-respiratory arrest is still neces-
sary for a patient who has contingently died of BD,
because the brain-dead body, such as Jahi McMath, is not
ready for funeral and burial or cremation. It still has to go
through the necessary cardio-respiratory arrest induced by
the removal of a ventilator before it can go through
normal postmortem confirmation and procedures. This
fundamental difference from the traditional death—death
that is the final and necessary common pathway to the
ultimate non-existence for every human being—makes the
informed choice about BD both available and desirable
(and at the same time makes an informed refusal of
traditional death a logical nonsense). Some might argue
that cases of instant death from crushed head or decapita-
tion necessarily die of BD and are counterexamples to my
claim. While those cases might have a similar pathophy-
siology of BD clinically diagnosed in hospitals, they are
not cases of BD because BD is, as discussed later, a clinical
diagnosis that requires meticulous clinical evaluation
following the established protocol. Without this clinical
procedure of BDD, the clinical diagnosis of BD is not
recognized, even though it is suspected.2
Why, then, does the contingency of BD make informed
consent available and desirable? Simply put, a contingent
event can go otherwise, and if something can go other-
wise, there is usually a choice to go otherwise. In fact,
many steps leading to BDD are under the control of the
medical team and alterable. That is not to say that
traditional death by cardio-respiratory criteria allows no
choice. There are situations in which cardio-respiratory
death (CD or circulatory death) is controlled by the med-
ical team to achieve certain goals and choices are available.
The best example is controlled donation after circulatory
determination of death (controlled DCDD) [8]. In this
protocol, a patient with severe brain damage with ex-
tremely poor prognosis (but not brain dead) is removed
from a ventilator at the time and place of choice of the
medical team (“controlled”), and observed until the heart
stops. After a short waiting period following the cardiac
arrest, vital organs are harvested for transplantation. This
whole process, including the determination of death by
circulatory criteria, requires consent of the patient or
family because, among other reasons, the timing of CD is
contingent upon a decision of the medical team.
The most common choice for CD is between cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation (CPR, or “full code”) and a
do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order. This choice is now
routinely given to patients and families in a hospital,
particularly when the prognosis is poor. While the main
purpose of CPR/DNR is to decide on the use or nonuse of
resuscitative efforts and life support systems when the
heart and breathing stop, it also gives a chance to decide
in which way cardio-respiratory death should be deter-
mined. The use of DNR entails a traditional death deter-
mined by a spontaneous cessation of heartbeat and
respiration, which is not intervened by the medical team.
In contrast, CPR means that an all-out intervention to
reverse cardio-respiratory arrest must fail before death is
determined. In other words, the determination of death
with DNR does not question the irreversibility of CD
(notwithstanding the legal definition of CD), whereas
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the determination of death after attempted and failed
CPR requires the establishment of the irreversibility
of cardio-respiratory arrest before CD is pronounced.
This choice is given to patients because it is contin-
gent upon the decision and action of clinicians. There
is an important parallel between BDD and attempted
and failed CPR. BDD determines irreversible cessation
of the entire brain function, whereas failed CPR deter-
mines irreversible cessation of the cardio-respiratory
system. Both establish legal death. Both have alternatives.
An alternative to failed CPR is not to do CPR at all, or
DNR or “allow natural death” (AND). An alternative to
BDD is CD, which should ensue even if BD is not esta-
blished . This might be called “allow cardiac death”. It is
worth reminding ourselves that one of the supporting
arguments for equating BD as human death has been that
“even with extraordinary medical care, these [somatic]
functions cannot be sustained indefinitely—typically, no
longer than several days” ([President’s Commission [9]
p35—emphasis added). Another alternative is an elective
termination of life support. However, only CD currently
comes with an opt-out option to establish the irrever-
sibility of the lost function. The thesis of this essay is to
introduce an option for BDD, comparable with that for
failed CPR, to opt out of establishing the irreversible
cessation of the function, and to choose the traditional
method to determine death.3
Feasibility of informed consent for the diagnosis of brain
death
The next consideration for consent to the diagnostic
process of BDD is whether there is any room to accom-
modate such a consent in the middle of extremely critical
intensive care. Indeed there is often no choice because if
CD comes first, it is impossible to die of BD, and even
if BD comes first, if asystole (CD) comes close after BD,
there is no time to diagnose BD, let alone consent to
the diagnostic process, before CD. Thus, almost every
patient’s family accepts their physician’s statement that
their relative has deceased by neurologic or cardiac criteria
and assumes that there was no choice. However, there are
times when options are available between proceeding to
the diagnostic process of BDD versus continuing care with
the anticipation of approaching CD. Because BD is a
highly controlled death in a hospital, there is a unique
leeway of several hours to several days between the time
of suspected BD and the pronouncement of death. I
suggest that this period is an ideal window of opportunity
for the family to make important end-of-life decisions.
Several factors can influence the decision to proceed or
not to proceed to BDD: severity and prognosis of the brain
damage, severity and prognosis of systemic organ failure
(particularly in the cardiopulmonary system), candidacy
for organ donation, the length of stay in the ICU, and
family preferences, among others. In current practice,
because of the high priority of organ donation and the
need to reduce the cost of ICU, BDD is often performed
as soon as it is suspected, as exemplified in the McMath
case.
It may also be argued that, at least in the US, the
choice between consenting or not consenting to BDD is
impermissible except for New Jersey and New York,
because the Uniform Determination of Death Act (1980)
or UDDA [10] allows only one definition that should not
be chosen at will. As discussed later in detail, this argu-
ment confuses the diagnostic process of BDD and the
criteria of BD. This proposal does not let the family
choose which criteria of death are to be used. It only lets
the family consent to or decline the diagnostic process
of BDD for many reasons besides the choice of criteria.
However, the family can, of course, still refuse BDD be-
cause they refuse to use the criteria of BD. Is this imper-
missible? The law does not say which criteria must be
used under which condition. The major constraint is
metaphysical: nobody can die twice by two different
criteria under the UDDA. Thus if one is determined
dead by neurologic criteria first, that person cannot die
by cardio-respiratory criteria later, or vice versa. Which-
ever comes first, the law only says that the patient is
determined dead by either brain or cardio-respiratory
criteria (exclusive disjunction), and that is final. Thus, it
is permissible to delay death by CD by artificial means,
even if it comes first, and pronounce BD first, which is a
routine practice of organ procurement. Likewise, it is
permissible to delay death by BD by delaying BDD and
pronouncing CD first, which is the current proposal.4
In either scenario, whichever death is pronounced first
stands as legal death, but there is still room for physicians,
in the controlled environment of an ICU, to choose, to a
certain extent, which death is to be pronounced first. That
is where the input of the family can be incorporated.
Ethical dilemmas in brain death determination
If informed consent is meaningful and feasible, what
are the important ethical dilemmas that necessitate
informed consent or refusal of the diagnostic process of
BDD? First, let us consider the potential benefit of BDD. If
the deceased is a motivated organ donor, death by neuro-
logic criteria fulfills her wishes. For organ donors, a rela-
tively expeditious BDD is needed to accommodate their
wishes to donate the freshest organs. If we wait too long
without BDD, transplantable organs may deteriorate or
the patient may die from CD, and lose a chance to donate
organs. If the patient and/or family abhor a prolonged
hospital stay in a terminal and unconscious condition, an
early diagnosis of BD and the termination of life support
would also be consistent with their wishes.
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On the other hand, if the patient and family are skeptical
about the concept of BD and reject organ donation, like
the McMath family, they have nothing to gain by BDD.
Their main concern is the prognosis of neurologic damage
and survival. They are in absolutely no hurry to receive a
diagnosis of death. If anything, they want to continue
therapy and delay determination of death as long as
possible. Thus, from the perspective of patient- and
family-centered care, it is necessary to provide the latest
and surest diagnosis of death for non-donors.
Another aspect of the dilemma is the diagnostic accu-
racy of BD. Organ donors need a high sensitivity or low
threshold for the positive diagnosis of BD, while non-
donors need a high specificity or high threshold. (This
threshold can be adjusted by how strictly the physician
adheres to the diagnostic criteria, with the low threshold
being less strict adherence, and the high threshold being
stricter adherence.) Of course, not all donors want to
have an expeditious diagnosis of death, nor do all non-
donors want to have a delayed diagnosis of death. The
point is that the difference in needs between donors and
non-donors for appropriate timing of BDD and the
balanced sensitivity and specificity of diagnosis are in
opposite directions.
This leads to another crucial ethical dilemma for phy-
sicians and hospitals, and perhaps for society in general.
They have an obvious vested interest in the early diag-
nosis of BD because the earlier the BD diagnosis is
made, and with a lower threshold for positive diagnosis
(or a higher sensitivity), the more they will benefit. Such
a diagnosis would result in the increased supply of trans-
plantable organs, a higher turnover rate of expensive
ICU beds, and a lower overall cost. Is there any risk of
making an early and potentially premature BDD on the
part of physicians, hospitals, and society in general? I
cannot think of any because such a diagnostic deviation
will never be discovered because of the built-in mecha-
nism of the “self-fulfilling prophecy” that leaves no trace
behind, as discussed in the next section. Consequently,
I submit that it is this conflict of interest, the stark
lopsidedness of the risk-benefit balance of BDD—minimal
risk and great benefits for physicians, hospitals, and
society, versus unknown risk or infinite risk (legal death)
and little or no benefit for the patient or the family, particu-
larly those who reject organ donation and BD itself—that
justifies, and morally requires, the introduction of informed
consent prior to the diagnostic process of BDD.
Lack of transparency in the diagnosis of brain death
Another important concern for families with a dying
loved one is the accuracy and transparency of death
determination. The inherent problem of the diagnosis of
BD is that the diagnosis is invisible from the layperson’s
perspective. Unlike traditional CD in which the family
can see, feel, and touch the event of death themselves,
BD is hidden from the family’s perception. BDD is
usually made retrospectively, but there is no noticeable
difference in the patient’s appearance and behavior
before and after BDD. This imperceptibility of the diag-
nosis of BD can engender various emotions in families,
including suspicion, skepticism, and the fear of diagnos-
tic error. It is true that CD can also lack transparency
when irreversible cardiac arrest is not properly demon-
strated. Premature disposal of the dead is a long-standing
fear among laypeople throughout human history. That is
why every culture has different means to ensure the accu-
racy of death determination [11]. Many cultures have a
wake, or a time immediately following death determi-
nation in which family members stay with the deceased,
which serves this purpose. By following typical postmor-
tem changes that develop overnight into the next few
days, such as algor-, rigor-, and pallor mortis, hypostasis,
and putrefaction, the family is reassured that their loved
one is ready for burial or cremation. Therefore, families of
patients like Jahi McMath, who show no sign of postmor-
tem changes, may be afraid of diagnostic error and the
premature termination of life support.
In all fairness, I strongly doubt that there was any
significant technical or human error in the diagnosis of
the McMath case. Two expert physicians evaluated Jahi
at two different time points and reached the same
conclusion. Without doubt, she satisfied the criteria. How-
ever, this fact is almost irrelevant for skeptical families
and the public because the concern over the accuracy
of the diagnosis comes from its imperceptible nature
and the counterintuitive results of the diagnosis itself,
which is never experienced in traditional death.
The difference in the results of death determination
between BD and CD is so wide that normal human
intuition can hardly comprehend that the current Jahi
McMath who seems to be peacefully asleep in an apart-
ment is equivalent to a corpse buried for more than
2 years beneath a tombstone. Media reports from
medical and ethics experts invariably emphasized that
Jahi’s appearance is merely artificial due to ventilator
support and that she is, in fact, a cadaver.5 Even so, the
public continues to wonder: If the machine can support
her for more than 2 years in this condition, how is this
condition the same as the traditional death, which no
machine can even stop?6 Folk metaphysics raises another
question that those medical and ethics experts need to
respond to: If Jahi’s family had refused the diagnostic
process itself and had not received the diagnosis of BD,
Jahi today would have been considered alive and would
not have been called a cadaver. How could the same and
identical Jahi today be both alive and dead depending on
whether or not she went through the diagnostic process
of BDD?7
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The diagnosis of BD is a clinical diagnosis without any
demonstrable objective data, such as absence of pulse
and flat electrocardiogram in the case of CD. Flat elec-
troencephalogram used to be a confirmatory test for BD,
but it has become no longer mandatory in the US in
recent years [12]. Confirmatory tests in general are
discouraged by the leaders of the current practice of
BDD [13]. In fact, when there is a discrepancy between a
clinical diagnosis of BD and the result of confirmatory
tests, there is no other gold standard to decide which
one is correct. Thus, confirmatory tests can only aggra-
vate the diagnostic confusion, and those tests have now
been renamed ancillary tests. They are used only when
clinical evaluation is limited. The concern for diagnostic
error also comes from practice variation and protocol
violation, which have been discussed in the neurology
literature for many years [14, 15]. In one recent study,
out of 261 BD cases, 18 % did not adhere to the estab-
lished guidelines, and neither the apnea test nor another
alternative ancillary test were done in 7 % of cases,
which is an outright violation of the protocol [16]. The
fear of diagnostic error is further fueled by another
obscure aspect of BDD, which is the lack of any retro-
spective confirmation of the accuracy of the diagnosis.
Following positive BDD, life support is promptly termi-
nated or vital organs are harvested, which leaves no
opportunity for retrospective examination of the accu-
racy of the diagnosis. Beyond rare exceptions, such as
the McMath case, there is no window for retrospective
review. This problem has been characterized as a
“self-fulfilling prophecy” in the White Paper by the
President’s Council on Bioethics ([17], 41–2). In other
words, in principle, the current practice of BDD effectively
precludes the possibility of discovering diagnostic errors.
Furthermore, there are not even any specific postmortem
pathological findings [18]. The alleged truth of the diag-
nosis of BD is necessarily unfalsifiable.
Leaders of the current practice of BDD insist that
BDD has “perfect diagnostic accuracy” ([13], 77), but
that statement itself is also confusing to families and the
public. It does not mean that the diagnosis of BD is
correct 100 % of the time against a certain independent
gold standard, such as objective laboratory tests, inde-
pendent retrospective case review, or pathological inves-
tigation. It is perfectly accurate because the clinical
diagnosis of BD that physicians make based on the esta-
blished standard is final and that is in and of itself the gold
standard. In other words, the diagnosis of BD is always
correct by default as long as the clinician follows the
protocol correctly.
To clarify this type of diagnostic accuracy, I will take
an example of the diagnosis of fibromyalgia, which
laypeople often see or hear about. Fibromyalgia is a syn-
drome characterized by widespread body pain, tenderness,
fatigue, and many other somatic symptoms, but there is
no objective data to confirm this diagnosis, such as labora-
tory or imaging tests, or pathological examination. The
diagnosis is purely clinical and is considered correct when
a physician, usually a rheumatologist, determines that the
patient fulfils the established diagnostic criteria of fibro-
myalgia, including physical examination. As in the diagno-
sis of BD, physical examination requires highly precise
evaluation, which includes tender spot examination at 18
specific spots of the body with 4 kg/cm2 pressure. The
diagnostic criteria are so precise that if the patient has 11
or more tender spots out of 18, the diagnosis is positive,
but if she has 10 or fewer, the diagnosis is negative. How-
ever, there is no external gold standard to confirm the
diagnosis, and it is perfectly accurate by itself as long as
the diagnostic protocol is followed correctly. Yet, the
disease entity of fibromyalgia continues to be controversial
among specialists because, as in the case of BD, there is
nothing tangible to indicate the presence of this condition,
and empirical research to establish a unifying pathophy-
siology has been inconclusive [19].
This does not mean, of course, that the diagnoses of
fibromyalgia and BD are unimportant or false. In gen-
eral, clinical diagnoses may not describe the true state of
affairs in the patient, but serve as an important explana-
tory device to describe why the patient is the way he or
she is, and as a normative device to advise the patient
and the family what to do to relieve or cure the condi-
tion ([20], 6–7). A clinical diagnosis of BD explains why
the patient’s condition is so hopeless, and provides a
normative explanation that this condition is considered
equivalent to death, but is optimal for donating vital
organs. There is no question about the importance and
usefulness of the diagnosis of BD. However, a clinical diag-
nosis does not necessarily represent accurately what is
going on anatomically, biochemically, and physiologically,
or the state of affairs in the patient. There is always some
discrepancy between a clinical diagnosis and other find-
ings made by other methods. There is no surprise, then, if
we see a discrepancy between a BD diagnosis and a find-
ing by another diagnostic test showing, for example, some
functioning brain tissue. Likewise, from the layperson’s
perspective, the discrepancy between Jahi today in her
apartment, which is one end result of the clinical diagnosis
of BD, and a buried cadaver, which is the usual end result
of the traditional death determination, can be explained
by the discrepancy between a contingent clinical diagnosis
of BD and the necessary biological and physical reality of
traditional death. Alternatively, the fact that her status of
death or life depends on whether she underwent the diag-
nostic process in 2013 demonstrates how BD is, unlike
traditional death, contingent on clinical context. I suggest
that a lack of such understanding is one of the sources
of confusion among the public. The accuracy of the
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traditional death determination by cardio-respiratory
criteria is backed by the visible and palpable reality in
the world. This is what the public expect from an
accurate death determination, but the accuracy of BDD is
considered intrinsic to the diagnosis itself without any
extrinsic standard or tangible evidence in the state of
affairs in the world. A rare opportunity of retrospective
review provided by cases such as Jahi McMath fails to
demonstrate the expected postmortem confirmation.
The corollary of the review of the current practice
of BDD above is the need for transparency of the
diagnostic process of BDD, and providing the family
with some sort of tangible evidence for confirmation
of death that they can clearly see and accept. One possibi-
lity is to invite the family to stay at the bedside to witness
the findings of the diagnostic procedure and receive an
explanation on the spot. This approach was evaluated by a
recent study and showed a significant improvement in the
family’s understanding of BD [21]. However, families still
require crucial information on BDD prior to the com-
mencement of the diagnostic process in order to make
important decisions, because once the diagnostic process
has started and the result turns out to be positive, the
family is already at the point of no return. A positive result
entails an immediate and incontestable legal death, and as
seen in the McMath case, almost no recourse is left to the
family to reverse this determination. In other words, the
diagnostic procedure of BD has, besides procedure-related
risks that I will describe in the next section, a unique
consequence that is of extremely high risk for uninformed
families because of its immediate translation into legal
death.
The practice of informed consent prior to the diagnosis of
brain death
The important goals of informed consent prior to BDD
are the disclosure of relevant and contextualized infor-
mation on BD, the family’s understanding of the proce-
dure, meaning, risks, and consequences of BDD, and the
family’s informed decision to consent or decline. Forms
signed by the surrogate may mean nothing unless an
honest and complete disclosure, genuine and open-minded
conversation and information exchange, and mutual
understanding between the physician and the family/
surrogate take place. A recent survey of families of pediatric
ICU patients who received end-of-life care demonstrated
that one of the most important priorities that families
request is honest and complete information [22]. Instead
of quickly presenting a form and having the family sign it
in the waiting room, the informed consent should be
performed in a well-prepared family conference with the
important stakeholders present. First, the physician must
disclose why the procedure is recommended at this time.
It is important to ensure a clear understanding of the
meaning of BD, which is different from persistent vegeta-
tive state or coma. Many surveys show the majority of the
public has an erroneous understanding of BD, and this
point should be emphasized. It is also important to have
the family understand the difference between the irrever-
sible cessation of the function of the whole brain and the
structural destruction of the whole brain, which is the key
to understanding why imaging studies show a large por-
tion of the brain apparently still intact. Other important
points include the following: BDD is a retrospective diag-
nosis, and once BDD is positive, BD has already occurred
even though the family may be unable to perceive any
change during that time period; patients with BD usually
have a cardiac arrest within several days ([9], 35),
although, like Jahi McMath, there are rare cases of indivi-
duals who can maintain this condition for weeks to
months with a ventilator support [23]; and there is no
confirmed case of recovery of consciousness after BDD,
though we have limited data because, except for historical
cases in 1960’s and 70’s and cases in Japan and New Jersey,
almost every case is removed from life support.
It is also crucial that the procedure-related risks be
disclosed fully. The main risk comes from the apnea test.
Hypotension and cardiac arrhythmia are experienced in
3–33 % of cases [24], which might require the diagnostic
procedure to be aborted. Jeret has raised the possibility
of informed consent for the apnea test because of the
significant risk including death caused by the procedure
itself [24]. However, the major risk that leads to imme-
diate death, which the family should fully understand, is
the fact that a positive result of BDD means an irrevers-
ible and incontestable legal death followed by withdrawal
of mechanical ventilation and life support, except when
the patient is considered an organ donor or she is preg-
nant. In most practices, this point seems obvious and
tacitly agreed between the physician and the family, but
is seldom explained explicitly, much less in writing,
before the procedure. While one of the most frequent
reasons for proceeding to BDD is to clarify the current
status of the patient, it is misleading to say, “we are
going to do this test to see if the patient is brain dead or
still in a coma and make a care plan accordingly”,
because this statement implies that care options are
available in either case of the disjunction, when, if BDD is
positive, the patient is declared dead and there is no op-
tion for further care but to donate organs or to withdraw
life support. Thus it is imperative to add, “if this evaluation
turns out positive, the only options are to terminate the
care or to donate organs because the patient is found
legally dead at that point.”
The family should also know that, as discussed above,
BDD is a clinical diagnosis and there is no independent
gold standard or tangible evidence for the family to confirm
the accuracy of this diagnosis. The patient will continue to
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have heartbeat, respirator-driven breathing, and other signs
of life that will not change before and after BDD as long as
life support is continued. As with every clinical diagnosis, it
is the physician’s judgment that is final, and that result may
not necessarily reflect the whole reality of what might
happen in the body after death determination. Some might
argue that such a statement will undermine the family’s
confidence in BDD, but I humbly submit that it is ethically
unconscionable to proceed to a death diagnosis while with-
holding such critical information and keeping the family in
the dark. In an expression suitable for the family’s education
level and the degree of understanding, the unfalsifiability of
the diagnosis of BD should be disclosed. As shown above,
this is the fundamental difficulty and the source of confu-
sion in comprehending the equivalence of BD and CD.
Otherwise, the public and families continue to be unable
to comprehend why Jahi’s current condition is, despite all
appearances of life, still considered equivalent to death as
they know it.
Contrasting with such caveats for BDD, the physician
and the medical team should, in the spirit of shared
decision making, also emphasize the positive aspects of
BDD and express their recommendations on the values
and benefits that the family can draw from BDD. Most
importantly, the family can make an informed decision
on organ donation, even if it was not considered earlier.
While this topic is eschewed before BDD in current
practice, I suggest that, if the patient is considered a
possible candidate for organ donation, the medical team,
if not a transplant coordinator, should disclose in a
thoughtful and compassionate manner that BDD is the
critical first step for organ procurement. Of course, it is
pointless and inappropriate to request organ donation
before death is pronounced, but depending on how it is
presented and how the family is prepared for such a
discussion, this conversation may serve as an important
introduction to consideration for organ donation. As
discussed earlier, BDD is often needed as soon as it is
clinically suspected if the patient is deemed a donor
candidate because CD can follow any time and eliminates
the chance for donation. This critical fact should not be
withheld from the family in the process of consent. Other-
wise, the family could erroneously believe that the rash
request for the diagnosis of BD is medically necessary for
the patient. If the patient is deemed unsuitable as a donor,
the family can still come to terms with the decision to
withdraw life support if BD is firmly established. The care
team may stress this point to undecided family members,
though those families should be allowed to take more time
if needed than potential donors. Most families are eager to
know the prognosis of the loved one and have no difficulty
agreeing to BDD after balancing the risks and benefits.
Informed consent is incomplete without presenting
available alternatives. A simple alternative is to wait and
see, particularly if CD is anticipated within days. This
approach may be called “allow cardiac death” as men-
tioned earlier. It is important to disclose this option
because families may not know that it is indeed an
option. This option is particularly important for those
who are fundamentally opposed to the concept of BD. If
the family chose not to agree to BDD at this time, the
physician can tell them that the medical team will con-
tinue life support for the next day or two and then come
back to this question, and ask them to think over this
issue, perhaps including the question of organ donation.
In the meantime, the physician could stress the fact that
the prognosis is extremely poor regardless of BDD, and
it is a good time to think about the possibility of an
elective withdrawal of life support at the time and place
most appropriate for the family and their cultural
community. A DNR order and a request for no new life-
saving intervention, such as antibiotics, tube feeding, and
renal dialysis, along with generous comfort measures, may
also become a topic. At this stage, I suggest that the phy-
sician refrain from a forced and unilateral diagnostic
procedure of BDD against the family’s opposition. The
whole purpose of obtaining informed consent is to proceed
to the diagnosis only after the family’s understanding. At
the same time, the refusal of the family should be inter-
preted as a context-dependent decision which can be sub-
ject to change depending on the next clinical development
and further reflection of the family members. Because
of the precipitous nature of terminal conditions and the
emotional turmoil of the family in those cases, it is hard
to predict what will follow next. The patient may die by
CD that night. Alternatively, the family may change their
mind and agree to a withdrawal of care or proceeding to
BDD a few days later, or the patient may improve a little
and BD seems less likely next morning. I suggest that the
above approach be repeated while incorporating new
developments that unfold during the course of the care.
I realize that the above conversation has already taken
place informally in many hospitals, but the point I make
here is that all such conversations should take place
prior to BDD, not after in the form of debriefing and
negotiation for a withdrawal of life support and organ
procurement. In other words, we should invest time
and efforts before the procedure so that the decisions after
the procedure become much easier. Informed consent is
meant to be a device to ensure this priority. A family con-
ference held prior to BDD also serves as a pre-diagnostic
counseling, and the family’s needs should be addressed
compassionately. For those cases without family or an ap-
propriate surrogate decision-maker, a reasonable effort
should be made to locate an alternative surrogate decision
maker. However, barring any clear indication of cultural
and religious convictions (vide infra about New Jersey and
New York), the team can proceed to BDD according to an
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established protocol of each state and hospital for end-of-
life decisions for those cases without surrogate decision
makers.
For a significant portion of the population who do not
believe in the doctrine of BD for various reasons, philo-
sophical, cultural, religious, or otherwise, this informed
consent becomes the last chance for patients and fam-
ilies to exercise their dissent. Of course, many among
this group may still want to donate their organs, and
informed consent can give them a chance to carefully
weigh the risks of BD against the benefit of donating
organs. However, for those who reject the entire paradigm
of BD followed by organ procurement, or BD followed by
a withdrawal of life support, and prefer death by the trad-
itional criteria, their wishes and preferences are respected
by this informed consent without violating any law. For
such families and patients, who are sometimes from
religious and cultural minorities, even the small risk of
the diagnosis of BD will become infinitely great if the
denominator of the risk-benefit ratio, that is, the benefit,
is zero. It is important to keep in mind that the risk-
benefit ratio is all relative to the patient’s and family’s
perspective. The negligible risk of BDD perceived by the
medical team and those who accept the current practice
of BDD can be felt to be enormous by those who find only
risks and no benefit.
Potential problems of distributive justice
Several side effects can be anticipated from the introduc-
tion of informed consent, and I will offer some measures
to prevent or mitigate such issues. First, I will examine
the problem of distributive justice. In the next section, I
will examine its effect on organ procurement. Allowing
those hopeless patients without clear diagnosis of death
to continue to stay and receive care in the ICU would be
very costly, and deprive badly needed ICU beds from
those patients who have much more appropriate needs.
Furthermore, the critics would argue, even if these
patients can be maintained outside ICUs, they will still
incur hefty healthcare expenditure, which our society
may not be able to support. My response is that, since
resource allocation in the current healthcare system is in
and of itself an irresolvable ethical issue, I suggest that
we need to look at the effect of the proposed informed
consent from a wider perspective.
First, it should be noted that, when the Ad Hoc
Committee of Harvard Medical School (1968) [25]
published a landmark report on BD, there was little
guidance to the disposition of those numerous hopeless
patients staying in ICUs, and BDD was instrumental in
the 80’s through the 90’s in establishing a guidance to
terminate care for those most severely brain-damaged
cases. However, today the situation is entirely different.
It is now almost routine to withdraw life support from
many patients with severe devastating conditions with
extremely poor prognosis, including permanent uncon-
sciousness, with full family consent regardless of the
status of BD [26, 27]. Suspected cases of BD should be
treated no differently from other hopeless cases in the
ICU in terms of bed allocation. I suggest that we should
try an elective withdrawal with full agreement with the
family first, which is much more respectful, compassio-
nate, and dignified than unilaterally performing BDD
and terminating life support without consent. If CD is
expected shortly after BDD, which is often the case,
there is no need to proceed to BDD for those who
decline consent, because those patients reject organ
donation anyway. Of course, this approach by no means
excludes an option to proceed to BDD. The point is that
the medical team has to have a conversation on this
topic with the family first, and find out in which direc-
tion the family wishes to proceed. During the course of
the dialogue for elective withdrawal, the family might
consider BDD as a reasonable justification for withdrawal.
In such a case, informed consent is established and BDD
should ensue. Alternatively, during the course of such a
conversation, the family might decide to donate organs,
which also leads to timely BDD with consent.
It is also true that there will always be the exception of
families who absolutely refuse BDD or elective withdrawal
for cultural, religious, or personal reasons. As usual with
those families who insist that physicians “do everything,”
it is important to set the goals and limits of medical care,
and articulate what they want to accomplish in the hos-
pital within such parameters. I suggest that those cases be
consulted with the hospital’s ethics consultation service,
and every available options and limitations be considered,
including the transfer to a step-down room outside ICU
with a DNR order, a transfer to another facility, procee-
ding to BDD by overriding family’s wishes, or terminating
life-saving care through a court order, among others.
Some states such as Texas and many hospitals now have
explicit policies for such “futile” care, which can be
followed.
Finally, statistics from Japan, where BD is used only
for organ donors with explicit consent, and the default
mode of death is only CD, might be informative [28]. In
Japan, most patients with BD remain on life support
because they are legally still alive, unless an advance
directive and/or the family have consented to organ
donation. What happened in Japan is an important show-
case of what would happen in the US if we eliminated the
above mentioned “self-fulfilling prophecy” paradigm and
kept BD cases on ventilators. The Japanese government
uses the term “long-term brain death” in its official report,
which is defined by “survival” longer than 30 days. Jahi
McMath is such a case under these criteria. Two nation-
wide surveys done in Japan on pediatric cases of BD
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during the periods of 1987–1999 and 1999–2003 showed
that about 21–24 % of BD cases fell into the category of
long-term BD, which is much more common in children
than in adults [29, 30]. That means that if the US were to
keep pediatric brain-dead patients on ventilators, it is
possible that roughly one in five cases would have conti-
nued to be in this condition for longer than 30 days. How-
ever, even though these surveys were not exhaustive, the
incidence of such cases per general population in Japan
seems extremely low. If we extrapolate their incidence to
the US using the ratio of total population between the US
and Japan of roughly 2.3 around the years of those
surveys, cases like Jahi McMath would occur at most 4 to
9 cases per year in the entire US. Of course, we would
never keep all of them on life support, and real numbers
are expected to be much lower. Thus, we may be justified
in the belief that the use of health-care resources in the
US for such patients who opt out of BDD and are treated
as a prolonged coma, but in fact are cases of undiagnosed
long-term BD, should also be very low. I should also add
that Japan spends less than half of the US for healthcare
expenditure per capita, even if it keeps all those hopeless
cases on life support, and it accomplishes the longest life
expectancy and one of the lowest infant mortality rate in
the world [31]. As I wrote earlier, the ethics of resource
allocation requires a wider perspective than just focusing
on a small number of cases with long-term BD.
Concern about a negative effect on organ procurement
Another important concern is that this proposal might
have a negative impact on the willingness of families to
donate organs. More generally, the introduction of
informed consent prior to BDD might work as a barrier
to organ donation and thus decrease the number of
donated organs. My response is that this might be the
case, but the opposite is also possible. First, informed
consent is now ubiquitous in hospitals for so many
procedures that most patients and families may not feel
anything special about this protocol. Second, if the
unwillingness to donate in some parts of the population
is based on poor understanding of the reality of BD
and organ procurement, as results of a survey of organ
procurement coordinators suggest [32], improving the
transparency of BDD with full disclosure about the diag-
nostic process and mutual communication by introducing
informed consent and pre-diagnostic counseling should
work positively. Third, many organ donors have a greater
goal for helping others in need, and informed consent
prior to BDD should not present an issue. For those
donors, BDD is a necessary part of the whole package of
organ donation, and the perceived risk, if any, is offset by
the greater benefit of donation. Fourth, for families of
prospective organ donors who have not made up their
mind, pre-diagnostic counseling and informed consent for
BD offer an opportunity to discuss the possibility and
benefits of organ donation, as discussed earlier. Such pre-
paratory conversations could achieve a better result for
the post-BDD request for donation by an organ procure-
ment coordinator than the current approach. With the
current approach, the family is forced to make a difficult
decision on donation in a hurry in the wake of the
emotional turmoil of the positive BDD without sufficient
preparation. With a preparatory discussion prior to BDD,
family members can evaluate the issue in detail during the
diagnostic process of BDD, and may consequently give a
better thought-out decision.
Nevertheless, if a negative impact on organ donation
from the full disclosure of BD and the opt-out option of
BDD is still a concern, we are faced with another moral
dilemma: Is it morally justified to increase the supply of
vital organs at the cost of depriving those families of
crucial information and their chance for informed deci-
sions, particularly if some of these patients may not need
BDD (because CD is imminent, for example), or at least
early BDD is unnecessary if they decide not to donate
organs, or they want to avoid BD altogether if such a
choice is available? In other words, is organ procurement
so important that every BD candidate should go through
an early diagnostic protocol of BD when it may not be
necessary or desired by the patient and family? While an
opt-out option for organ procurement has been much
debated [33], I contend that an opt-out option for BDD
should also be debated in public discourse.
Comparison with other pluralistic approaches to brain
death
The state of New Jersey has an explicit religious exemp-
tion from the application of the UDDA [34], and New
York requires hospitals to give “reasonable accommo-
dations” for “religious or moral objections” to BD [35].
The most important difference of such accommodations
of these states from the current proposal is that they
allow two definitions of death used for different popula-
tions (religious and others), while the present proposal
upholds the current UDDA and only gives a chance
to the family to consent to or decline the diagnostic
process to fulfill one of the two criteria. As discussed in
the second section (conceptual justification), the current
proposal involves the options in the first and second
steps of the diagnosis of BD (the decision to proceed, and
then execute the diagnostic procedure), while the policies
in New Jersey and Japan (as I will discuss shortly) involve
the options in the third and fourth steps (which criteria to
be used and how the result is applied).
Another important difference is, as with any other
informed consent, the reason for declining BDD can be
anything, whether it is the risk-benefit analysis of the
diagnosis itself, the consequence of the diagnosis, or
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religious, philosophical, or personal reasons. Because
informed consent prior to a medical intervention is a
well-established medical standard, as opposed to a special
exemption only for religious reasons, there is no require-
ment for a major legal overhaul, whether under state laws
or the UDDA.
As described earlier, Japan decided to define BD as
human death only in the context of organ donation for
the first time in 1997 [28]. The decision on organ dona-
tion must come first prior to BDD in a form of an advance
directive (donor card, driver’s license, health insurance
certificate, or online) which includes the consent to both
BD and organ donation, and the family is required to
consent in order to proceed to organ procurement.8 Death
outside the organ-donation program is limited to CD.
While this approach is considered by some as allowing
a personal choice of the definitions of death [36], it is only
within the context of organ donation and must go through
rigorous criteria. In other non-donation scenarios, there is
no option for patients and families to choose BD as a
reason to end futile care with hopeless prognosis.
(However, the diagnosis of BD itself for a prognosticating
purpose without legal death determination is still permit-
ted, and that is why the incidence of long-term BD cases
is known in Japan).9
The critical difference of the Japanese system compared
with the US system (except for New Jersey) is that Japan
has two definitions of death, CD for the general popula-
tion and BD for consented organ donors, but each group
must not use the other group’s definition. This is because,
if death were defined as a singular event in Japan as in the
UDDA, cases of long-term BD and consented organ do-
nors would have had the same status of life or death. That
entails either harvesting vital organs from living donors
(if CD were the singular definition), or keeping cadavers
(long-term BD) on ventilators in nursing homes (if BD
were the singular definition), which is an utterly unaccept-
able consequence. Compared with this Japanese approach,
the UDDA defines only singular “death” (without quali-
fying words), but accommodates the pluralism of the
criteria, not of the definition, in the form of irreversible
cessation of either “circulatory and respiratory functions”
or “all functions of the entire brain”. The proposed
informed consent only allows families to either consent to
or decline a procedure that fulfills one of the two criteria,
i.e. neurologic criteria, not the definition, thus upholding
the UDDA. If the surrogate of a suspected brain dead
patient does not consent to BDD and the patient dies of
CD, he died of CD, and did not die of BD first and then
CD later. His death is still a singular event under the
present proposal. In contrast, an unfortunate situation of
Jahi McMath is that she legally died in California, but her
status in New Jersey is different. If she eventually under-
goes cardiac arrest in New Jersey, she will be pronounced
dead in New Jersey by CD, which entails that she dies
twice unless the court in California repeals the previous
determination of her death.10 As Margaret Lock [28] used
in her book title, dying twice is one of the problematic
consequences of the two-death system, whether in the US
or in Japan. I wish to emphasize that the present proposal
does not involve any change in the UDDA or a fundamen-
tal overhaul of the current foundation of the legal defi-
nition of death, but it upholds the present one-death
two-criteria system of the UDDA.11
The preference of BDD could also be incorporated
in an advance directive or a donor card, similar to the
Japanese system, but it is unlikely to be used extensively,
as the experience in Japan already shows. The most recent
nationwide survey done by the Japanese government
showed only 12 % of the population registered their donor
status (thus consented to or declined BD) through the
registration system [37]. The majority of the population,
whether in Japan or in the US, are by and large reluctant
to complete advance directives, let alone deciding which
death criteria they want to choose in a very remote and
unlikely scenario of BD. Instead of filling advance direc-
tives when they have very little understanding, it is much
more relevant and pragmatic to use informed consent and
surrogate decision makers when the real need arises and
the decision is situated in a real-life contemporaneous
context. If anything might be helpful, the public should be
encouraged to discuss this topic with family members and
prospective surrogate decision makers in advance. Such
conversations could eventually enable these proxies to
make more relevant and authentic decisions.
Conclusion
If we strive for patient- and family-centered medical care
and shared decision making [27, 38], which I believe we
should, I argue that we ought to have a simple and easily
accessible device to accommodate the wishes of those
who would like to express their unique preferences in
the end-of-life decisions at the last moment. This has
already been carried out in different forms, including the
DNR order and the Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining
Treatment (POLST) [39]. I have submitted an argument
that a similar measure be taken for the diagnosis of
brain death because of its lack of transparency, its
unique epistemic structure of the diagnostic reasoning,
and the complex risk-benefit profile, as discussed above.
I believe that, using informed consent as a guiding topic,
a family conference prior to the initiation of the diagnos-
tic protocol of brain death would serve this purpose
without requiring a legal overhaul or causing any major
disruption in the utilization of healthcare resources and
organ procurement. This essay is only a conceptual and
ethical argument without any supporting empirical data.
This author has no illusion that it provides an instant
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solution to the decades-long controversy over the theory
and practice of BD. Nevertheless, if it opens up a discus-
sion that has not been considered previously, it might
become an important step toward improving the under-
standing and satisfaction of the families of those patients
who face imminent brain death.
Endnotes
1While detailed discussion on the philosophy of medical
diagnosis is outside the scope of this essay, I take a pos-
ition that medical diagnosis is fundamentally a social
action, or a social and technological construct ([40], 345).
This position contrasts with a prevailing “truth-finding
model” of medical diagnosis. Under this traditional model,
medical diagnosis is viewed as a physician’s statement of
the fact about the “true reality” of the patient. As a “truth-
finder”, a physician may feel that diagnosis is her duty to
uncover whatever pathological reality may exist in the
patient. In contrast, under the social-constructivist model,
medical diagnosis is performative, rather than constative
([40], 337). It is a social and speech act that is dependent
on the social and techno-historical context of the patient
and the diagnostician. With this understanding, medical
diagnosis is not much different from any other medical
interventions clinicians make on patients, and there is al-
ways an option to do differently or not to do at all depen-
ding on the clinical context and the patient’s preferences.
2Here, the metaphysical discussion of medical diag-
nosis in endnote 1 is relevant again. Undiagnosed and
unrecognized state of affairs in human body may exist
and can be uncovered scientifically, but this conjecture
should be clearly distinguished from a clinical diagnosis
in a specific clinical context, which is totally dependent
on diagnosticians. Succinctly put, there is no diagnosis
without a diagnostician who diagnoses it within a spe-
cific clinical context ([40], 276).
3This parallel logic between failed CPR and BDD has
already been discussed in the President’s Commission
Report on defining death in 1981 ([9], 83–4). In this
report, this parallel is used to argue that medical inter-
vention should be stopped after BDD, just as we do after
failed CPR, because both BDD and failed CPR establish
the diagnosis of death. In this report, there is no men-
tion that failed CPR can be opted out whereas BDD can
never be opted out. My argument is that as long as failed
CPR and BDD equally establish irreversible human death
and failed CPR can be opted out through informed consent
(which is DNR), BDD could also be opted out through
informed consent (which is “allow cardiac death”).
4It is indeed not uncommon that CD happens while
delaying BDD for various reasons, such as trying to
correct hypothermia or clear the influence of interfering
drug effect.
5Those who take the “truth-finding model” of medical
diagnosis, which I briefly discussed in endnote 1, would
insist that Jahi is dead and that is the reality and the
“true state of affairs”. According to this received view
of medical diagnosis, the “truth of death” is “out there”
in the pathophysiology of her brain that is the immutable
reality. From the viewpoint of social- and techno-con-
structivist model of diagnosis, which this author holds,
any medical diagnosis is a context-dependent construction
of a diagnostician ([40], 321). That means that the diag-
nosis of BD is a construction of those specific diagnos-
ticians who diagnosed her as such in December 2013.
Since this action itself is highly contingent and the diag-
nosis of BD itself is also highly contingent, as I showed
above, the relationship of the present Jahi McMath and
her diagnosis in 2013 is also contingent. The corollary of
this view is that there is no surprise if Jahi’s current brain
does not fulfill the criteria of BD even if it did in 2013.
6Obviously, our moral intuition differentiates cadavers
from human life that is totally dependent on artificial
means, such as ventilators and left ventricular assist
device (LVAD). If one’s moral intuition tells that a patient
in persistent vegetative state is a living human being, most
likely it will tell the same for Jahi McMath and others in
brain death, as their external behavior is indistinguishable
from a persistent vegetative patient who is also paralyzed
and ventilator dependent.
7While space precludes further discussion on this matter,
suffice it to say that the very root causes of this confusion
are, I believe, the following: first, conflation of the contin-
gent event of BD and the necessary event of human death
as a singular event of death; second, ignoring the fact that
BD is a distinct state with substantial duration of time in
which the somatic life is maintained despite the dead brain.
The public is well aware that Jahi McMath, brain-dead
organ donors being prepared for organ procurement, and
brain-dead pregnant women are all maintained in this state,
despite the experts’ stipulation that BD is a moment of
death. This is one of the reasons for a commonly used ex-
pression in media reports such as, “This patient was diag-
nosed brain dead two days ago, and today he finally
deceased after doctors turned off life support system”.
8Since 2009, the family may sign the consent even
without an advance directive of the patient.
9If, as in Japan, BDD were not linked with the legal
death determination in the US and other western
countries, the risk of BDD would have been much more
“benign” and BDD could have been done as part of
medical investigation without strict consent.
10According to media reports, the family of Jahi McMath
has petitioned the State of California to rescind the death
certificate. The court ruling has been pending, but the court
granted that it will consider any evidence to prove that she
is alive if the family can produce such evidence [41].
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11This statement may seem contradictory to my above-
stated criticisms to equating BD as human death. While
space precluded a complete discussion of my position
on the ongoing debate on whether brain death should
be equated to human death, I believe, as thoroughly
discussed by other scholars [23, 42, 43], that the current
doctrine of equating BD to human death is philosophically
and empirically indefensible. In endnote 7, I discussed two
critical logical flaws. I also believe, along with other
scholars, that the ultimate and logically coherent solution
is to treat BD as a clinical state that is ideal for organ
donation but is clearly distinguished from human death.
At the same time, it behooves that the dead donor rule be
amended, so that the harvesting of organs from cadavers
as well as brain dead patients is permitted. The end result
would be similar to the current proposal, in that non-
organ donors are not automatically removed from life
support after positive BDD because they are treated as
“not yet dead”, while organ donors can continue to donate
freely. The major difference is almost insurmountable
challenges of removing the dead donor rule and redefining
BD as a separate state from human death, which requires
sweeping changes in the public opinion and the law.
The present proposal is aimed at achieving a similar result
with much fewer changes to the current system.
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